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Notes and Comments
CORPORATE DISSOLUTION FOR ILLEGAL, OPPRESSIVE
OR FRAUDULENT ACTS: THE MARYLAND SOLUTION
Section 79A (b) (2)
in 1967, provides that:

of the Maryland Corporation Law, enacted

Any holder of shares entitled to vote at an election of directors
of a corporation may petition a court of equity to dissolve the
corporation on one or both of the following grounds:
(2) that the acts of the directors or those in control of the
corporation are illegal, oppressive or fraudulent.'
Section 79A further provides that the court, in a proceeding initiated
by such a petition, "within its sound judicial discretion . . . shall determine whether the corporation should be dissolved" and "shall make
a judgment or a final order dissolving the corporation" if it finds that
the corporation should indeed be dissolved.2 A similar provision,
adopted by the American Law Institute in Section 90 of the Model
Business Corporation Act,3 was first enacted in Illinois in 1933' and
has subsequently been enacted in twenty other states. 5
1. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 79A (b) (2) (Supp. 1967). The provision applies
to all corporations. The Maryland Close Corporation Law explicitly adopts the rights
of action provided by § 79A and, in addition, provides for judicial dissolution in the
event of "internal dissension." MD. ANN. CoDE art. 23, § 109 (a) (Supp. 1967).
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 79A (c) (Supp. 1967).
3. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 90 (a) (1966)
The . . . court shall have full power to liquidate the assets and business of
a corporation:
(a) In an action by a shareholder when it is established:
(1) That the directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate
affairs and the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and that irreparable
injury to the corporation is being suffered or is threatened by reason thereof; or
(2) That the acts of the directors or those in control of the corporation are
illegal, oppressive or fraudulent; or
(3) That the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power, and have failed,
for a period which includes at least two consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect
successors to directors whose terms have expired or would have expired upon the
election of their successors; or
(4) That the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted.
4. Business Corporation Act, § 86, [1933] Ill. Laws 351, now codified as ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.86 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
5. ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 21(78) (Supp. 1967) ; ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.540 (1962);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-908 (Supp. 1967) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.94 (1962) ; Miss.
CODE ANN. § 5309-204 (Supp. 1966) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.485 (1966) ; MONT. REv.
CODES ANN. § 15-2290 (1967); NEBR. Rzv. STAT. § 21-2096 (Supp. 1965); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 51-29-16 (Supp. 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-21-16 (1960); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 57.595 (1968) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2107 (1967) ; S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 12-22.15 (Supp. 1967) ; 2 THE CORPORATION MANUAL 38 (1967) (S.D. statute);
TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT arts. 7.05, 7.06 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-92 (1962);
VA. CODS ANN. § 13.1-94 (Supp. 1968); WASH. REv. COD ANN. § 23A.28.170
(Supp. 1967); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.771 (1957 & Supp. 1968) ; WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-36.86 (1965). See also GA. CODS ANN. § 22-711 (1966) ; Companies Act of 1948,
11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 210.
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Prior to the enactment of Section 79A, Section 80 of the Maryland Corporation Law was the only Maryland statutory provision for
involuntary dissolution of a corporation by judicial action. It provided
for dissolution by a "court of equity" on the suit of "any stockholder"
when the corporation was found to be "insolvent." ' In the event of an
"equally divided vote of the stockholders" resulting in a "failure to
elect directors" at "two successive annual elections," a court of equity,
under Section 52(e), could, on the application of any stockholder,
appoint a "receiver." '7 The powers of such a receiver, as set out in
Section 81 (a), included the power to liquidate the assets of a corporation and close its affairs.8
The amended Corporation Law retained Section 80, with only minor
changes, but repealed Section 52(e).' The deadlock situation previously treated in Section 52(e) is now dealt with in Section 79A (b) ( 1 ),
which has expanded the powers of the court in the event of a deadlock
to include the power to dissolve.1" In addition, Section 79A provides
for petition for dissolution by "the holder of shares entitled to vote
not less than twenty-five per cent of all the votes entitled to be cast"
in the event "directors are so divided that the votes required for board
action cannot be attained" or "the stockholders are so divided that
the votes required for the election of directors cannot be obtained.""
Section 79A applies to all Maryland corporations, since the section
is explicitly incorporated
by reference in Section 109 of the Close
2
Corporation Law.'
In the past, no Maryland court has ever explicitly held that a
court of equity has the power to dissolve solvent corporations in the
absence of statutory authority.' In cases of wasteful, fraudulent or
6. MD. ANN. CODS art. 23, § 80 (1966), as amended, MD. ANN. CoDn art. 23,
80 (Supp. 1967).
7. MD. ANN. ConS art. 23, § 52 (e) (1966), repealed, ch. 649, § 7 [1967] Md.
Laws 1319-20.
8. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 81 (a) (1966). § 81 was not affected by the 1967
amendments to the Corporation Law. "Liquidation" is defined as the sale of the corporation's assets and the distribution of the proceeds to its creditors and stockholders,
and is generally synonymous with "winding up." "Dissolution" is defined as the termination of the corporation's existence as a legal entity, and necessarily requires "liquidation" as part of the process of dissolving. From the standpoint of a minority
shareholder's concern in preserving his interest, the distinction between dissolution
and liquidation is insignificant, but courts have placed varying degrees of emphasis on
the distinction, variously recognizing a power to liquidate under circumstances where
there is a confessed absence of power to dissolve or denying a right to liquidate on
the basis of a lack of power to dissolve. See notes 13 & 15 infra and accompanying text,
9. Ch. 648, § 7, 11967] Md. Laws 1319-20.
10. MD. ANN. CODS art. 23, § 79A (b) (1) (Supp. 1967).
11. MD. ANN. CODS art. 23, § 79A (a) (Supp. 1967).
12. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 109 (a) (Supp. 1967). In addition, Section 109 (a)
provides for judicial dissolution in the event of "internal dissension" in a statutory
close corporation. For an analysis of the involuntary dissolution provisions of the
Maryland Close Corporation Law, see Hall, The New Maryland Close Corporation
Law, 27 Mo. L. Rlv. 349-51, 360-63 (1967).
13. See, e.g., Barton v. International Fraternal Alliance, 85 Md. 14, 36 A. 658
(1897); Mason v. Supreme Court of the Equitable League, 77 Md. 483, 27 A. 171
(1893). But see Hagerstown Furniture Co. v. Baker, 158 Md. 574, 149 A. 556 (1930),
where a receiver, appointed for misconduct by the directors, was permitted to sell the
company's assets when it appeared that the company could no longer be run profitably.
The court reasoned that, if it did not possess the power to authorize such a sale, the
purpose of the appointment of the receiver, that is, the preservation of the company's
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illegal conduct, the courts appointed receivers to take charge of the
corporation's assets.' 4 The court-appointed receivers were not granted
the authority they now possess under Section 81(a) of the corporation law to sell the assets of the corporation, because the courts did
not wish to sanction, by indirect means, a dissolution that they could
not order directly. 5 Therefore, except for those receivership cases
which may clarify the meaning of terms like "illegal" and "fraudulent,"
there is no basis in the Maryland common law for the new provision
for dissolution on the grounds of misconduct of those in control of
a corporation.
The enactment of the misconduct dissolution provision reflects
a desire to protect the interests of shareholders at the expense of
director freedom of action. However, the language of the provision
does not reveal clearly what conduct will be grounds for dissolution.
Given the severe economic losses which dissolution produces, the fear
of judicial dissolution may hamstring the directors' exercise of business
judgment to a greater extent than can be justified by the shareholder
rights protected by the provision. This Note will elaborate on the
criteria set forth in the dissolution section by examining analogous
statutory and common law standards and will suggest changes in
Section 79A designed to more properly balance the need for shareholder protection and the desirability of maintaining director freedom
of action. Given the vague criteria for dissolution, the danger of
broad judicial construction may have the further effect of discouraging
new companies from selecting Maryland as their state of incorporation;
full consideration of that effect is outside the scope of this Note.
assets, would be defeated by the very administration of the receivership. The court
made it clear that the power being exercised was not statutory in origin.
14. The specific language used by the courts to describe the offensive misconduct
varies somewhat. Some courts suggested that receivers could be appointed in cases
where those in control of the corporation were guilty of conduct which was "ultra
tires, fraudulent or illegal." Wall & Beaver Street Corp. v. Munson Line, Inc., 58 F.
Supp. 101, 107 (D. Md. 1943); James T. Powers Foundry Co. v. Miller, 166 Md. 590,
595, 171 A. 842, 845 (1934); Howeth v. Coulbourne Bros. Co., 115 Md. 107, 117,
80 A. 916, 920 (1911); Callaway v. Powhatan Improvement Co., 95 Md. 177, 185,
52 A. 916, 918 (1902); Du Puy v. Transportation & Terminal Co., 82 Md. 408, 442,
33 A. 889, 895 (1896) ; Shaw v. Davis, 78 Md. 308, 318, 28 A. 619, 622 (1894). Others
indicated that appointment of receivers was desirable in the event of "fraud or spoliation, or imminent danger of the loss of property." Williams v. Salisbury Ice Co., 176
Md. 13, 27, 3 A.2d 507, 514 (1939) ; Hagerstown Furniture Co. v. Baker, 155 Md.
549, 558, 142 A. 885, 891 (1928) ; Baltimore Skate Mfg. Co. v. Randall, 112 Md. 411,
414, 76 A. 491, 492 (1910); Davis v. United States Elec. Power & Light Co., 77
Md. 35, 40, 25 A. 982, 984 (1893). In Coffman v. Maryland Publishing Co., 167 Md.
275, 286, 173 A. 248, 253 (1934), the court felt that "wasteful, fraudulent or ultra
vires" conduct warranted the appointment of a receiver. There were also indications
that misconduct was not a sufficient ground for the appointment of a receiver at
common law. Mason v. Supreme Court of the Equitable League, 77 Md. 483, 486,
27 A. 171, 172 (1893): "If the officers of [a corporation] should be guilty of misconduct, fraud, or mismanagement, a Court of equity has full power to restrain and
enjoin them; but it will not . . . take away the rights of the share or certificate
holders either by dissolving the corporation or by placing its affairs in the hands of
a receiver." Receivers were actually appointed only in the Hagerstown Furniture and
Du Puy cases.
15. Mason v. Supreme Court of the Equitable League, 77 Md. 483, 27 A. 171
(1893). The Federal District Court for the District of Maryland, in restating Maryland law on the issue, cited Mason but qualified the statement with the phrase "except
possibly in very extraordinary cases." Wall & Beaver Street Corp. v. Munson Line,
Inc., 58 F. Supp. 101, 108 (D. Md. 1943).
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The Maryland statutory scheme for dissolution in the event of
misconduct on the part of those in control of a corporation appears in
two separate subsections of Section 79A. This produces a peculiar
result: Section 79A (b) provides that a holder of voting shares may
petition for dissolution on the grounds of "illegal, oppressive or fraudulent conduct," 16 but Section 79A (c) leaves the final determination of
dissolution within the "sound judicial discretion" of the court. 7 Apparently, the standard of "illegal, oppressive or fraudulent" conduct applies
only to the standing of a shareholder to petition for dissolution. The
actual judicial decision to dissolve the corporation is evidently not
governed by that standard. Thus, the phrase "illegal, oppressive or
fraudulent" is not a statutory standard for judicial dissolution at all,
and there are, strictly speaking, no legislative criteria for the actual
judicial determination of the desirability of dissolution.
Of course it could be argued that the legislature intended the
courts to exercise their "sound judicial discretion" within the framework of the "illegal, oppressive or fraudulent" language set out in
Section 79A (b)." Even then, however, the standard would be so
vague that the courts would be able to exercise considerable breadth
of discretion in the dissolution of corporations for the misconduct of
controlling interests.
Under either interpretation of the statute, those in control of a
corporation are given no clear guidelines as to the specific conduct
which will result in involuntary dissolution. This uncertainty, together.
with the severe economic consequences accompanying dissolution, may
result in overly cautious conduct on the part of those in control of a
corporation. Moreover, this uncertainty may enable a minority shareholder, by threatening suit for dissolution, to exert a greater influence
on the conduct of the business than his interest warrants. Thus, the
absence of a precise legislative standard may greatly restrict director
freedom of action and may even permit a new variety of "strike suit."
The uncertainty created by the absence of a statutory standard
is enhanced by the subtlety of the two judgments which a court must
make in the exercise of its "discretion" to dissolve, i.e. the decision
to intervene at all and, assuming intervention is proper, the determination that dissolution is the appropriate remedy in the case at issue. In
the first place, judicial intervention in the affairs of a solvent corporation at the request of a shareholder involves consideration of two
conflicting principles of corporate organization. "It is .

.

. fundamental

in the law of corporations that the majority of its stockholders shall
control the policy of the corporation . . . . "" Discretion as to what
16. MD. ANN. CODM art. 23, § 79A (b) (2) (Supp. 1967).
17. MD. ANN. CODx art. 23, § 79A (c) (Supp. 1967).
18. Section 79A (b) may be interpreted as a legislative directive to the courts to
dissolve corporations according to the standards stated therein. The introductory language of that section reads as follows: "Any holder of shares entitled to vote at an
election of directors of a corporation may petition a court of equity to dissolve the
corporation on one or both of the following grounds: . . ." If the phrase "on one

or both of the following grounds" modifies "to dissolve" rather than "may petition,"
then the section can be viewed as a legislative command to the courts to decide the
dissolution issue on the basis of the standard set forth in Section 79A (b) (2).
19. Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., 143 Ill. 197, 32 N.E. 420, 423 (1892).
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action would be most beneficial to the success of the corporate enterprise is vested in the majority stockholders so that, for practical
reasons, the ordering of corporate activity will be fundamentally private
and not public. Thus, it is said that courts will not interfere with the
ordinary business judgments of those in control."0 "But even more
fundamental than the doctrine that the majority rules, is the principle
that the corporate assets and profits must be administered for the benefit
of all the stockholders."'" Given the separation of ownership and
management of property inherent in the corporate form of business,
the "discretion" to manage should never be so broadly interpreted as
to include appropriation for personal use. Therefore, a "fiduciary duty"
is imposed on those in control of corporate affairs; when a majority
of shareholders effectively controls business conduct they assume such
a duty.22 The judicial decision to intervene, therefore, entails a conclusion as to the proper limits of "business judgments."
Secondly, the determination that dissolution is the appropriate
remedy involves a balancing of the sufficiency of available alternative
remedies to protect the complaining shareholder against the economic
losses which all shareholders will suffer if dissolution is ordered. The
usual extra-judicial remedy for those dissatisfied with the management
of a corporation is to remove the directors or to sell out. 23 Individual
wrongful transactions by directors may be remedied by an accounting
or an injunction.24 However, a controlling group which embarks on
a concerted program of conduct which amounts to appropriation of
the other stockholders' contributions to the corporate assets would
undoubtedly not exercise the removal remedy. The sufficiency of the
accounting or injunction remedy will be inversely related to the degree
of "incorrigibility" of the controlling group's conduct.25 Judicial intervention in the form of an accounting or injunction may well sufficiently impress those in control with the availability of sanctions so
that they will not commit further wrongful acts, but the difficulty of
continual judicial monitoring of an "incorrigible" controlling group may
require a more permanent solution. To be weighed against the court's
20. Id. "Unwise and indiscreet management .... due to mistakes of judgment or
mere default, would not be sufficient to grant the .. . [prayer for the appointment of
a receiver]." Williams v. Salisbury Ice Co., 176 Md. 13, 23, 3 A.2d 507, 512 (1939).
21. Hornstein, A Remedy For Corporate Abuse - Judicial Power to Wind Up a
Corporationat the Suit of a Minority Stockholder, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 220, 224 (1940).
22. Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919) ; A. BERLX &

G.

MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 239 (1933).

23. Nobel v. Gadsden Land & Improvement Co., 133 Ala. 250 31 So. 856, 857
(1902) ; Benedict v. Columbus Constr. Co., 49 N.J. Eq. 23, 23 A. 485, 489 (Ch. 1892).
See generally MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 52 (d) (1966) (removal of directors by
stockholder action at "any meeting" duly called at which a quorum is present). The
availability of the "sell out" remedy is dependent upon the existence of a market for
the complainant's shares. In the case of the closely-held corporation, there may be
virtually no market for the complainant's shares, while in the case of the larger,
widely-held corporation listed on an exchange there is a ready market for his shares.
The availability of a market for the complainant's shares would also be weighed
against the extent of the loss inherent in dissolution in determining the appropriateness
of the dissolution remedy.
24. Mason v. Supreme Court of the Equitable League, 77 Md. 483, 27 A. 171
(1893).
25. See J. TINGLE, TE STOCKHOLDER'S REMEDY OP CORPORATE DISSOLUTION

43 (1959).

19681

CORPORATE

DISSOLUTION FOR MISCONDUCT

estimate of the degree of incorrigibility is the economic loss which all
shareholders, innocent and guilty, suffer in a forced sale of a business.
If feasible, judicial monitoring of the controlling group's conduct is
preferable to dissolution.
II.

GUIDELINES FOR COURT APPLICATION OF THE
"MISCONDUCT" DISSOLUTION PROVISION

While there is no Maryland common law background for the new
involuntary dissolution provision and while the dissolution provision
simply grants jurisdiction to courts of equity to hear petitions for
dissolution without setting concrete "standards" for dissolution, the
construction given comparable statutory provisions in other jurisdictions provides a starting point for the interpretation of the Maryland
provision. The misconduct provisions enacted in other states are based
primarily on the formulation adopted by the Model Act.2" While the
language of the Model Act provision, unlike the Maryland provision,
apparently sets out the "illegal, oppressive or fraudulent" language as
a statutory standard, it is, like the Maryland provision, primarily a
grant of jurisdiction to dissolve. The statutes are, therefore, sufficiently
similar that a consideration of decisions under statutes based on the
Model Act provides a basis for a preliminary approach to an interpretation of the Maryland provision. Cases decided under the Model Act
provision for judicial intervention on the grounds of "misapplication
or waste" of corporate assets are also significant, since such conduct
"illegal, oppressive or fraudulent" language of
could fall within 2the
7
the Maryland act.
Most states having a misconduct provision permitting judicial
dissolution have, like Maryland, only recently enacted it, although
Pennsylvania and Illinois had such provisions as early as 1933. Consequently, there have been only sixteen reported cases involving the
In four of the sixteen
statutes based on the Model Act formulation.
cases, dissolution or liquidation was ordered. 29
26. See notes 3 & 5 supra and accompanying text.
27. The Maryland dissolution provision does not contain the "misapplication or
waste" language.
2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960);
28. Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill.
2d 566, 141 N.E.2d 45 (1957) ; Liddell
Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 Ill.
App. 2d 352, 213 N.E.2d 604 (1965) ; Frerk v. Frerk, 39 Ill. App. 2d
V. Smith, 65 Ill.
App. 2d 29,
401, 188 N.E.2d 773 (1964) ; Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 Ill.
184 N.E.2d 792 (1962); Seefeld v. Baer, 331 Ill. App. 408, 73 N.E.2d 140 (1947);
App. 216,
Lush'us Brand Distrib., Inc. v. Fort Dearborn Lithographing Co., 330 Ill.
70 N.E.2d 737 (1946); Sulinski v. Humboldt & Wabansia Bldg. Corp., 315 Ill. App.
392, 43 N.E.2d 181 (1942); 3333 Washington Boulevard Bldg. Corp. v. Ritchie, 300
Ill. App. 612, 21 N.E.2d 835 (1939) ; Long v. Wilson Stove & Mfg. Co., 277 Ill. App.
57 (1934); Haley v. Horjul, Inc., 281 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. 1955) ; Long v. Norwood
Hills Corp., 380 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. App. 1964) ; Kessler v. United Agencies, Inc.,
243 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. App. 1951) ("waste or misapplication" only); McMunn v.
ML & H Lumber, Inc., 429 P.2d 798 (Ore. 1967); Religious Press Ass'n v. Sunday
School Times Co., 151 Pa. Super. 69, 29 A.2d 344 (1942); Texarkana College Bowl,
Inc. v. Phillips, 408 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). See also Regenstein v.
J. Regenstein Co., 213 Ga. 157, 97 S.E.2d 693 (1957); Collier v. Mayflower Apartments, 196 Ga. 419, 26 S.E.2d 731 (1943); Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Soc.,
Ltd. v. Meyer, [1959] A.C. 324; Re H.R. Harmer, Ltd., [1958] 3 All E.R. 689;
Re Five Minute Car Wash Service, [19661 1 All E.R. 242; Elder v. Elder & Watson,
Ltd., [1952] Sess. Cas. 49.
29. In Long v. Wilson Stove & Mfg. Co., 277 Ill. App. 57 (1934), the court
appointed a receiver to liquidate the corporation under both the "illegal, oppressive
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In Long v. Wilson Stove & Manufacturing Co.,30 an Illinois case,
a family corporation was dominated by Wilson, who was director,
president and one-third shareholder. It was the practice of the three
directors to make decisions and, subsequently, to have them ratified by
stockholders without formal stockholders' meetings. The business
earned money from its founding in 1884 until the depression years of
1930-1932. Unable to stop losses, the directors passed a resolution to
sell the corporation's assets and the matter was approved by a majority
of the stockholders at a special meeting. The plaintiff, holder of 991
of the 4,500 outstanding shares, did not attend, although she was
notified of the meeting. Wilson had invited 300 potential buyers to the
sale, but no notices were published in newspapers or trade journals.
Wilson's bid was $15,000 on property valued at from $50,000 to
$100,000. The court appointed a receiver to liquidate the corporation,
holding that the conduct of the majority in approving a sale of the
corporation's assets at a time when there was clearly no market for
them was "oppressive and fraudulent" with respect to the plaintiffstockholder and was a "misapplication and waste" of those assets.
Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co."1 involved a deadlock situation; voting power was divided fifty-fifty, as were the directors. As a
result, no successors to the directors had been elected for ten consecutive annual meetings. The president of the corporation represented a
single faction. Plaintiff alleged that he had been deprived of participation in the management of the company, that the president had
organized another corporation with Lanzit funds and that this corporation was losing money, that the president hired an executive vicepresident at a $32,000 per year salary, that the president made arbitrary
deductions from the salary of the plaintiff, that the president had,
without board approval, borrowed money for the corporation from
institutions in which he had an interest,32 that the president had
executed a proxy to himself to vote the corporation's interest in a subsidiary, and that the president had failed to consult with the directors
on policy decisions. Plaintiff claimed that these facts showed "oppressive" conduct on the part of those in control. The denial of plaintiff's
right to participate in management and the "arbitrary and high-handed
manner" in which the president handled company affairs was held to constitute "oppressive" conduct justifying liquidation under the statute.8 3
or fraudulent" provision and the "misapplication or waste" provision of the Illinois
misconduct statute. In Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d 208, 170
N.E.2d 131 (1960), the court ordered liquidation under the "illegal, oppressive or
fraudulent" provision alone. In Kessler v. United Agencies, Inc., 243 S.W.2d 779
(Mo. App. 1951), the court dissolved the corporation on the grounds set forth in the
"misapplication or waste" provision alone. Liddell v. Smith, 65 111. App. 2d 352, 213
N.E.2d 604 (1965), invoked the Model Act provision as a whole, but the offending
shareholder in that case exhibited conduct similar to that in the cases decided under
the specific provisions.
30. 277 Ill. App. 57, 83-84 (1934).
31. 20 Ill.
2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960).
32. See also Collier v.Mayflower Apartments, 196 Ga.419, 26 S.E.2d 731 (1943),
where the majority stockholders in defendant corporation had cancelled a $20,000
debt owing to the defendant corporation by a second corporation wholly owned by the
majority for $12,500 when there was no question of that second corporation's solvency.
The complaint was held sufficient as stating a cause of action for fraud.
33. Gidwitz raises the problem of the interrelationship of the "deadlock" provision
of dissolution statutes and "misconduct" provisions. For treatments of dissolution in
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In Kessler v. United Agencies, Inc.,"4 a widow, who inherited the
majority interest in the defendant corporation, entered into an agreement with minority shareholders that she would vote her shares in
favor of liquidation if she failed to operate the business at a profit after
one year. At the end of the year, no dividends had been paid and the
widow-manager refused to allow plaintiffs to examine the corporation's
books, although she continued to draw a salary. In addition, it appeared
that she had credited corporate funds to personal accounts. Plaintiff
sought dissolution on the grounds that corporate assets were being
misapplied and wasted, and the Missouri trial court order to that effect
was upheld. 5
In Liddell v. Smith, 36 the plaintiff owned one-third of the outstanding shares of a corporation; the remainder were owned by the
defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had usurped control
of the corporation, had removed the books from the state, had removed
company equipment from land owned by the company to his own land,
and had generally sought to take over the assets of the business. Dissolution was ordered, but the decision was apparently based on the deadlock provision as well as the misconduct provisions of the Illinois statute.
These cases illustrate that the conduct required for dissolution
under the "illegal, oppressive or fraudulent" provision is not significantly different from that required for dissolution in the common law
dissolution case of Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co.," the leading nonthe deadlock situation, see J. TINGLE, THE STOCKHOLDtR'S REMEDY OF CORPORATE
DIsSOLUTION ch. 2-4 (1959) ; Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 778 (1952).
34. 243 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. App. 1951).
35. The court in Kessler stated that dissolution was a "drastic remedy" but that,
in this case, it was not invoked "against the wishes of a substantial group of stockholders who might want to continue the business" since "the stockholders had
already voted such liquidation and dissolution." 243 S.W.2d at 782. Whether the
result would have been different in the absence of the agreement is not indicated. In
the case of Strong v. Fromm Laboratories, Inc., 273 Wis. 159, 77 N.W.2d 389, 395
(1956), the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that, given the study that went
into the drafting of the involuntary dissolution provision, the absence of a commonly
adopted statutory provision, specifically a clause that dissolution be "beneficial to the
interests of the stockholders," implied a rejection of that requirement in an action
under a deadlock provision based on § 90 of the Model Act.
36. 65 Ill. App. 2d 352, 213 N.E.2d 604 (1965).
37. 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892). Plaintiff Miner and defendant Lorman
entered into a partnership to sell ice in 1869, and in 1874 the business was incorporated,
each partner receiving forty-three and one-half per cent of the stock issued. The
business prospered. Miner held the office of president and Lorman that of manager;
both received annual salaries of $1200. In 1881 Lorman bought out two complaining
shareholders and by 1882 held just over fifty per cent of the shares issued. In 1882
Miner, who handled the production end of the business, began to complain of the
loose manner in which Lorman, who handled the distribution end, accounted for
receipts. Lorman then filled the board of directors with persons subject to his control.
Lorman's salary was raised to $4,000 per year and one of his "directors" was hired as
secretary at a salary of $1000 per year. Miner was discharged from his office. Meetings
were held without notice of place so that Miner could not be present. No dividends
were paid. Rentals paid by the corporation for jointly owned property were higher
for Lorman than for Miner. Lorman leased a property he had purchased for $3500
to the ice company at a rate which returned $4,650 in six years. This land, eventually
sold to the company by Lorman, was later returned to him at a price less than the
company had paid despite the fact that the land's value had increased. Lorman guaranteed dividends to Carpenter, the only other principal stockholder, apparently in order
to insure her compliance with his conduct of the business. Upon Miner's petition, the
Michigan court ordered the company dissolved.
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statutory dissolution case, and subsequent common law dissolution
cases. The offensive "controlling group" conduct involved in those
common law decisions included purposeful failure to call meetings,"
refusal to allow stockholders to inspect the corporation's books when
they had that right or falsification of the corporation's records, 9 allocation of excessive salaries to themselves,40 appropriation of corporate
funds to personal use, 4 either through fraudulent transactions with
the company4 2 or fraudulent transactions with other companies substantially owned by those in control.13 In other such cases the con-4
trolling majority was found to have been guilty of mismanagement
or of withholding dividends, 45 sometimes with the purpose of depressing stock values so that the minority could be bought out. 46 A review
of both statutory and common law dissolution cases enables one to
catalogue the kinds of conduct for which dissolution has been ordered,
but the standard for that conduct remains vague and can be only
loosely characterized as prohibiting controlling group "appropriation"
of corporate assets. At the same time, however, the statutory and
common law cases clearly illustrate that dissolution will be granted
only for conduct which is flagrantly improper.
The term "oppressive," a term less familiar to the legal profession
than "illegal" or "fraudulent, '47 appears open to a broader, less strict
38. Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 64 F.2d 817 (4th
Cir. 1933) ; Henry v. Ide, 208 Ala. 33, 93 So. 860 (1922) ; Tri-City Electric Service
Co. v. Jarvis, 206 Ind. 5, 185 N.E. 136 (1933); Klugh v. Coronaca Milling Co., 66
S.C. 100, 44 S.E. 566 (1932).
39. Henry v. Ide, 208 Ala. 33, 93 So. 860 (1922) ; Green v. National Advertising
& Amusement Co., 137 Minn. 65, 162 N.W. 1056 (1917); Brent v. B.E. Brister Sawmill Co., 103 Miss. 876, 60 So. 1018 (1913) ; Bilby v. Morton, 119 Okla. 15, 247 P.
384 (1926).
40. Green v. National Advertising & Amusement Co., 137 Minn. 65, 162 N.W.
1056 (1917).
41. Henry v. Ide, 208 Ala. 33, 93 So. 860 (1922) ; Red Bud Realty Co. v. South,
153 Ark. 320, 241 S.W. 21 (1922) ; Riley v. Callahan Mining Co., 28 Idaho 525, 155 P.
665 (1916) ; Tri-City Electric Service Co. v. Jarvis, 206 Ind. 5, 185 N.E. 136 (1933) ;
State ex rel. Connors v. Shelton, 238 Mo. 281, 142 S.W. 417 (1911) ; Bilby v. Morton,
119 Okla. 15, 247 P. 384 (1926); Klugh v. Coronaca Milling Co., 66 S.C. 100, 44

S.E. 566 (1902).

42. Zeckendorf v. Steinfeld, 225 U.S. 445 (1912) ; Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke
Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 64 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1933) ; Holden v. Lashley-Cox Land
Co., 316 Mich. 478, 25 N.W.2d 590 (1947).
43. Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 64 F.2d 817 (4th
Cir. 1933) ; Lichens Co. v. Standard Commercial Tobacco Co., 28 Del. Ch. 220, 40
A.2d 447 (1944) ; Riley v. Callahan Mining Co., 28 Idaho 525, 155 P. 665 (1916);
Brent v. B.E. Brister Sawmill Co., 103 Miss. 876, 60 So. 1018 (1913).
44. Brent v. B.E. Brister Sawmill Co., 103 Miss. 876, 60 So. 1018 (1913);
Bernstein v. New Jersey Bankers Sec. Co., 109 N.J. Eq. 233, 156 A. 768 (1931).
45. Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 64 F.2d 817 (4th
Cir. 1933) ; Henry v. Ide, 208 Ala. 33, 93 So. 860 (1922) ; Red Bud Realty Co. v.
South, 153 Ark. 380, 241 S.W, 21 (1922).
46. Hampton v. Buchanan, 51 Wash. 155, 98 P. 374 (1908). For other cases
recognizing an inherent power in equity to dissolve at the suit of a minority stockholder, see Gettinger v. Heavy, 220 Ala. 613, 127 So. 195 (1930) ; Warner v. Bonds,
111 Ark. 238, 163 S.W. 788 (1914) ; Sant v. Perronsville Shingle Co., 179 Mich. 42,
146 N.W. 212 (1914).
47. The two courts which have sought to define "oppressive" have had to rely
on dictionary definitions. The Illinois Appellate Court in Central Standard Life Ins.
Co. v. Davis, 10 1I. App. 2d 245, 134 N.E.2d 653, 659 (1956), quoted the dictionary
phrases "unreasonably burdensome; unjustly severe", "tyrannical", "overpowering to
the senses." Later the court indicated that a cause of action would be stated if a
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interpretation than the existing statutory cases or the common law
cases would seem to require and, therefore, merits particular study.
Two Illinois cases have dealt with the narrow issue of "oppressive"
conduct. In both cases the courts concluded that the circumstances did
not establish oppression.
In Central Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Davis,4" plaintiff-corporation, a preferred stockholder in a hotel company, sought dissolution on behalf of itself and 400 other preferred stockholders. The three
defendant-directors held all the outstanding common stock at the commencement of the action. One director, who held 7990 of the 8000
outstanding shares of common stock, was also a majority owner in a
corporation set up to operate the hotel company in question. The
hotel company had shown profits from 1924, when it was chartered,
until 1931, but between 1931 and 1951, when the plaintiff purchased
his interest, no dividends had been paid. Accumulated dividends on
preferred stock amounted to approximately $1,000,000 while the assets
of the company were variously estimated to be $700,000, according
to plaintiff's evaluation, and $2,300,000, according to defendant's
appraisal. Gross annual income had increased from $400,000 in 1942
to $1,000,000 in 1951. Plaintiff claimed that, since the company had
never made profits, the only interest of the defendant in continuing
the company's operations was that derived from his exclusive control
and that failure of the defendant to liquidate in the face of depreciating
assets constituted "oppressive" conduct.
The master who first heard the case recommended dismissal for
want of a showing that the acts of the director had ever been complained of at a stockholder's or director's meeting. The appellate court
held that "oppressive" conduct was not established, since no evidence
of "mismanagement or misapplication of assets" had been presented.
The Supreme Court of Illinois rejected the requirement of "mismanagement or misapplication of assets" as a necessary ingredient of
oppression. The court also rejected the argument that "oppressive"
is "substantially synonymous with 'illegal' and 'fraudulent,' " and
acknowledged that " 'oppressive' does not necessarily savor of fraud."49
"clear abuse of trust" were shown. 134 N.E.2d at 660. The House of Lords, in
Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Soc., Ltd. v. Meyer, [1959] A.C. 324, 342, used the
terms "burdensome, harsh and wrongful."
48. 10 Ill. 2d 566, 141 N.E.2d 45 (1957).
49. 141 N.E.2d at 50. In defining "oppressive" in Davis, the Illinois Supreme
Court distinguished the case of Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal
Co., 64 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1933), on the ground that the conduct therein was "fraudulent" while the case then under consideration involved only "oppressive" conduct. The
distinction is dubious, however, and the weakness of the distinction undermines much
of what the Illinois court said about the meaning of "oppressive." In Tower Hill,
the defendant company was under the control of a single stockholder who held a large
majority of the common stock but little preferred stock. No meetings of stockholders
were held for thirteen years and the majority stockholder controlled directors during
that time. Preferred stock dividends were in arrears and assets were barely sufficient
to pay the preferred stockholders. Recognizing that he had little to lose and that
there was a good chance of increasing the value of his common stock, the majority
stockholder invested in a highly speculative venture, which ultimately failed. In an
action by a preferred stockholder the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, applying common law, affirmed the appointment of a receiver to wind up the corporation.
While the court characterized the conduct of the majority as an "abuse of power" and
as in "deliberate disregard of plaintiff's rights," it did not use the term "fraudulent."
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The court placed great emphasis on the fact that the increase in gross
income illustrated a prospect of gain, which made the "drastic remedy"
of dissolution inappropriate. In addition, the court pointed out that
since plaintiff had acquired his shares only recently at a price which
indicated speculation, he had "already taken advantage of the situation
he complains of in the price that he paid for his stock."5 The court
noted, however, that the dismissal did not mean that preferred stockholders must wait until the termination of the life of the corporation
before distribution of its assets would be ordered, and that "[t]ime
may show that there is no reasonable prospect of profitable operation."'"
The other Illinois case dealing with "oppression," Polikoff v.
Dole & Clark Building Corp.,52 involved a corporation reorganized in
1933 with two classes of stock, no dividends to be paid on the second
class as long as any shares of the first were outstanding. Plaintiff
owned under two per cent of the first class of stock and sixteen per
cent of the second class; defendant owned fifty-five per cent of the first
class and seventy-six per cent of the second class. Defendant and his
son-in-law were directors and officers from 1951 through the commencement of the action in 1958. Defendant received a salary of
$6,000 per year to manage the corporation's primary asset, a building
containing a movie theater, nine stores and a hotel. The operations
showed annual losses of $4,200 between 1952 and 1957 and a profit of
$1,700 in the year the action was commenced. Directors' fees of $300
per year paid previously were eliminated that same year. In 1953 the
real estate of the corporation was mortgaged to the defendant's wife
for $60,000, those proceeds being used to renovate the building. No
surplus was applied to the retirement of the outstanding shares of the
first class. The defendant refused to sell the corporation's real estate
at plaintiff's recommendation and, the plaintiff alleged, he spent too
little to advertise the hotel and had made little effort to secure a tenant
for the theater. The defendant was buying up corporation stock at
depressed prices. Recognizing that there was a danger of foreclosure
on the mortgage and that there was no reasonable prospect of retiring
the outstanding shares, plaintiff sought liquidation. The court found
the defendant's conduct was not "oppressive":
[T]he remedy of liquidation is so drastic that it must be invoked
with extreme caution. The ends of justice would not be served
by too broad an application of the statute, for that would merely
eliminate one evil by substituting a greater one - oppression of
the majority by the minority.
Almost all aspects of plaintiff's charges relate solely to business decision-making which by our statute is made the responsibility of the board of directors and the officers of a corporation.
Yet the
on that
50.
51.
52.

Illinois court in Davis made that characterization and distinguished the case
ground.
141 N.E.2d at 51.
Id.
37 Ill. App. 2d 29, 184 N.E.2d 792 (1962).
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Whether [the defendant] spent too much or too little for advertising, or for salaries, or for rehabilitation of the premises, are
matters with which the court will not concern itself - at least
not in so far as they bear on the question of liquidation.5"
The word "oppressive" also appears in the English Companies
Act of 1948.54 In Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society, Ltd. v.
Meyer,55 the majority stockholder was a company which entered into a
business with the minority stockholder in order to obtain the benefit
of his trade license and skills. When the license and services of the
minority stockholder were no longer needed, the majority offered to
buy him out at substantially less than fair value, and then diverted the
company's business to itself. This conduct was found to be "oppressive." In Re H.R. Harmer, Ltd.,56 the majority shareholder had acted
as sole proprietor from 1886 to 1947, when the business was incorporated. After incorporation he continued to dominate the business,
disregarding the resolutions of the board of directors. He committed
the company to the establishment of an additional foreign branch,
refused to permit board meetings to review his action in firing an
employee, charged his wife's travel expenses to the company despite a
board resolution, refused to renew an employment contract with a
particularly valuable employee, ordered the sale of an American subsidiary, and engaged a private detective to watch the company staff.
His conduct was found to be "oppressive."
While the broader English construction of "oppressive" is probably more consistent with the apparent purpose of the dissolution
statutes, to broaden shareholders' remedies, than is the Illinois construction, the cases illustrate that the conduct described by the term
"oppressive" is in reality no different from the unfair dealing or breach
of duty characterized as "fraudulent" in other cases. 7
53. 184 N.E.2d at 795-96.
54. 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 210:
(1) Any member of a company who complains that the affairs of the company
are being conducted in a manner oppressive to some part of the members (including himself) . . . may make an application to the court by petition for an order
under this section.
(2) If on any such petition the court is of opinion(a) that the company's affairs are being conducted as aforesaid; and
(b) that to wind up the company would unfairly prejudice that part of the
members, but otherwise the facts would justify the making of a windingup order on the ground that it was just and equitable that the company
should be wound up;
the court may . . . make such order as it thinks fit, whether for regulating the
conduct of the company's affairs in the future, or for the purchase of the shares
of any members of the company by other members of the company or by the
company . . . or otherwise.
55. [1959] A.C. 324, noted in 72 HARV. L. Rgv. 761 (1959).
56. [1958] 3 All E.R. 689.
57. The term "oppressive" has appeared in two relevant Maryland cases. In Shaw
v. Davis, 78 Md. 308, 317, 28 A. 619, 621 (1894), the Maryland Court of Appeals
quoted with approval from the English decision in MacDougall v. Gardiner, 1 Ch. D. 13
(C.A. 1875):
[N]othing connected with internal disputes between the shareholders is to be made
the subject of a bill by some one shareholder in behalf of himself, and others, unless
there be something illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent, - unless there is something
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A.

The Problem of the Widely-Held Corporation

The evil created by the uncertain statutory criteria for the degree
of misconduct which warrants dissolution is the infringement of freedom of corporate action. Directors and controlling shareholders may
be forced to make their business judgments more with an eye toward
avoiding a violation of that vague standard than toward serving the
best interest of the corporation. In addition, minority shareholders
may use the threat of dissolution to force the majority to accede to
their demands or, perhaps, to pay sizeable sums in "settlement" of
dissolution actions.
It is apparent, however, that the danger of this erosion of corporate freedom of action is greater with larger, widely-held corporations than with closely-held corporations. Accordingly, one possible
solution may be to limit the right of action for dissolution to the case
of the closely-held corporation. With the publicly-held corporation,
there is less likelihood that a group having voting control can be enlisted in concerted action to draw off corporate assets. Also, the availability of a market in which a complaining shareholder can sell out is
greater, and the economic losses sustained in a forced sale of the business are more severe (in absolute terms). Finally, the number of
"innocent" employees or shareholders affected by the dissolution is
larger. Since the equities against dissolution are strong in the case
of larger corporations, the number of deserving complainants who
would be deprived of the dissolution remedy by confining its application
to the close corporation situation is probably not large. Some states
have sought to confine the remedy to stockholders holding a minimum
percentage, typically from ten to thirty-three percent, of the outstanding stock, thereby limiting the availability of dissolution, for practical
purposes, to cases involving smaller corporations where large percentage holdings are more commonly found.5" While such a provision
enables directors to test proposed actions by sounding out major
stockholders before undertaking them, it also has the effect of arbitrarily cutting off worthy complainants59 without substantially aiding
ultra vires on the part of the company, qua company, or on the part of the majority
of the company, so that they are not fit persons to determine it ....
Accord, Williams v. Salisbury Ice Co., 176 Md. 13, 26-27, 3 A.2d 507, 513 (1939)
(quoting the statement with approval). Such a formulation would make "illegal,
oppressive or fraudulent" sub-categories of ultra vires. In Booth v. Robinson, 55
Md. 419 (1881), the expression "fraud or breaches of trust" was given as the standard
for shareholder action while the expression "fraud or oppression" was used in a similar
context several pages later. 55 Md. at 439, 451. The situations in which the two
phrases were used were not, however, sufficiently similar to allow the inference that
"breaches of trust" and "oppression" were synonymous in the court's view.
58.

CAL. CORP. CODE § 4650 (West Supp. 1967)

(33%

per cent of shares, exclud-

ing those of the wrongdoers) ; LA. Rvv. STAT. § 12.56 (1951) (20 per cent) ; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.196 (Supp. 1968) (10 per cent). The Montana legislature
recently repealed a similar provision in ch. 300, § 143, [1967] Mont. Laws 1029.
59. Cf. Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New
York, 32 CAL. L. R1v. 123 (1944). Hornstein makes the same argument with respect
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the directors in determining what conduct may give rise to dissolution.
Thus, the suggestion that the impairment of corporate freedom of
action may be corrected by restricting the right of action to the close
corporation situation appears unacceptable.
One device that would serve to alleviate the special danger to the
larger corporation is to establish a power in the court to fashion
remedies tailored to the situation at hand. Consistent with the rule
that the normal remedy of the dissenting stockholder is to sell his
stock, dissolution could be denied to those owning a class of stock
listed on an exchange."0 In the more likely case of a corporation
whose shares are not listed, those wishing to continue the business
could be permitted to avoid dissolution by purchasing the shares of
the complainant.6 1 The power to order such a buy-out, either by the
other stockholders or by the corporation itself, is probably inherent
62
in the power to dissolve. In Strong v. Fromm Laboratories, Inc.,
the Wisconsin court, in a deadlock situation, made such a disposition
without explicit statutory authority when it decreed dissolution "unless
a plan . . .be consummated whereby one of the two contending shareholder factions purchases the interest of the other in the corporation."6 3
Section 210 of the English Companies Act of 1948 explicitly grants a
broad discretion to the courts to fashion a remedy appropriate to the
circumstances, including the right to order a buy-out.64 That section
is, on its face, designed to protect the complaining stockholder from
the losses incident to dissolution and, accordingly, the House of Lords
in Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society, Ltd. v. Meyer65 upheld a
decision ordering the "oppressive" majority to purchase the shares of
the minority. Apparently, however, the remedy is viewed by the English courts as appropriate not only where it is necessary to protect
the complaining shareholder from losses due to winding up, but also
where it is equitable to afford the remaining stockholders the opportunity to continue the business. 6 Such a provision has the effect of
minimizing the possibility that a suit for dissolution could be used to
wind up a large, prosperous corporation to the detriment of a great
to derivative suit provisions that allow defendant to require that plaintiff provide
security for costs. Cf. MD.R.P. 328 (b).
As to the danger of strike suits in the derivative suit area, Hornstein suggests
that a legislative enactment permitting judicial refusal to dismiss suits in which a
purpose to force settlement is indicated could achieve the same protection afforded by
the "minimum percentage" and "security for costs" restrictions without denying the
right of action to anyone. Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits,
47 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 3 (1947). Cf. MD. R.P. 209 (d).
60. See generally D6L. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (k) (1) (1967), quoted in E. FOLK,
THE Ngrw DELAWARE CORPORATioN LAW 37 (1967), which denies a shareholder the
right to an appraisal remedy upon merger in cases where the relevant class of stock
is nationally listed.
61. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 4658 (West 1955) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. Rnv. § 33-117
(1958); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-1-81 (1966). Maryland provides such a remedy
in the case of statutory close corporations. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 109 (c)
(Supp. 1967).
62. 273 Wis. 159, 77 N.W.2d 389 (1956).
63. 77 N.W.2d at 397. The factions each controlled fifty per cent of the voting
shares.
64. See note 54 supra.
65. [1959] A.C. 324, noted in 72 HARV. L. REv. 761 (1959).

66. [1959] A.C. at 368-69 (dictum).
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number of innocent stockholders while, at the same time, insuring that
the remedy is available to even the smallest stockholder.
B.

The Necessity for Persistent Misconduct

Section 79A provides that the "acts" of the directors or the
controlling shareholders must be "illegal, oppressive or fraudulent,"
arguably suggesting that a continued course of such conduct is required
before dissolution is granted. Two states actually use the modifier
"persistent" and permit dissolution only on a showing of "persistent
fraud, mismanagement or abuse of authority '6 7 or "persistent unfairness." 68 Such a construction serves to clarify somewhat the vague
standards for dissolution by indicating that, whatever degree of abuse
will justify dissolution, that degree of abuse must inhere in several
transactions before dissolution will be ordered.
IV.

WHO MAY SEEK DISsOLUTION?

In the states adopting the Model Act provisions, the right of
action is granted to "a stockholder" or "a shareholder."6 9 While
several states have allowed actions by preferred, and presumably nonvoting stockholders,7" Maryland allows an action only by "[a]ny
holder of shares entitled to vote."' 7 ' The case of Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co.7 2 illustrates that the non-voting
stockholder's situation merits attention. In that case, with preferred
stock dividends in arrears, the holder of primarily common stock,
recognizing that he had little to lose, plunged the corporation into a
program of highly speculative investments to the detriment of the
interest of preferred stockholders.78 However, since the interests of
the preferred shareholder relate primarily to the payment of dividends and because dividend policy is a business decision basic to the
principle of private ordering of corporate activity, judicial intervention on behalf of preferred shareholders is probably improper.7 4 Thus
67. CAL. CORP. CODE § 4651 (e) (West 1955) (emphasis added).
68. CAL. CORP. CODE § 4651 (e) (West 1955)
ANN. § 301.49(3) (1947) (emphasis added).

(emphasis added); MINN. ST'rA.

69. See notes 3 & 5 supra.
70. Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 II. 2d 566, 141 N.E.2d 45 (1957)
Kessler v. United Agencies, Inc., 243 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. App. 1951) ; Religious Press
Ass'n v. Sunday School Times Co., 151 Pa. Super. 69, 29 A.2d 344 (1942).
71. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 79A (b) (Supp. 1967). Under MD. ANN. CODE
art. 23, § 44 (c) (1966), the "stockholder of record of pledged shares shall be entitled
to vote such shares ..
" For a case reaching the same conclusion in a non-statutory
involuntary dissolution proceeding, see Sant v. Perronsville Shingle Co., 179 Mich. 42,
146 N.W. 212 (1914). Proceeds from the sale of assets were held by the court pending
presentation of the stock certificates.
72. 64 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1933).
73. Prior litigation between the parties indicates that the preferred stock held
by the plaintiff was actually voting stock. See Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. v.
Piedmont Coal Co., 33 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1929). See generally, 40 HARV. L. Rrv. 994
(1927) (distinguishing the importance of interest of non-voting stock in the control
of normal corporate decision-making from its significance in the decision to dissolve
the corporation).
74. See Long v. Norwood Hills Corp., 380 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. App. 1964). Plaintiff
complained that defendant, a business organized to operate a country club in which
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the restriction of the dissolution remedy to voting shareholders is
probably desirable. The Maryland provision, however, might also be
construed to prohibit the holder of a voting trust certificate from
bringing suit under Section 79A (b) (2). Such a construction is not
warranted by the considerations applicable to preferred stock, and the
provision should not be construed to exclude such stockholders."
V.

CONCLUSION

The continued judicial denial of the right to dissolve a solvent
corporation in the absence of statutory authority dictated the need
for the enactment of Section 79A (b) (2). The variety of transactions
by which majority stockholders and their directors can "exploit"
minority stockholders makes the formulation of a precise statutory
standard for dissolution impossible. The lack of a clear standard in
the face of the extreme consequences resulting from transgressing the
vague standard may result in an undue restriction on director freedom
of action. A construction requiring "persistent" misconduct as a prerequisite to dissolution would clarify the standard somewhat. Beyond
that, the director can be given no precise guidelines by which to govern
his conduct; the most that can be done is to confer on courts a broad
discretion to formulate relief appropriate to the case at hand. The
"buy-out" order is an example of such tailoring of remedy; an order
that the corporation be dissolved, should misconduct be found in a
future case, is another. In the light of the reluctance of the Maryland
courts to develop the dissolution remedy on their own, the power to
formulate such additional remedies should probably be added by the
legislature to Section 79A (c). For example, following the Companies
Act of 1948, Section 210, the added provision might read as follows:
If on any petition under subsection (b) (2) the court is of the
opinion that an order dissolving the corporation would unfairly
prejudice some stockholders, but otherwise the facts would justify
dissolving the corporation, the court may make such order as it
deems appropriate, whether for regulating the conduct of the
corporation's affairs in the future, or for the purchase of the
shares of any stockholder by the other stockholders, by the corporation or otherwise.
most stockholders were members, had never paid cash dividends since its formation
in 1933 (it had paid one stock dividend in 1949) despite the fact that operations
were profitable in all but a few years. Plaintiff himself had held stock in the corporation since its formation but had withdrawn from club membership and had made no
formal complaint of such dividend policy until 1958. While the court found that under
all the circumstances, dissolution was inappropriate, it did warn the directors to be
more aware of the profit motive in their future conduct of corporate activities. Id.
at 474.
75. Cf. Southern Maryland Agricultural Ass'n v. Magruder, 198 Md. 274, 81
A.2d 592 (1951). There the defendant alleged that the plaintiff, having failed to
produce stock certificates in the defendant-corporation, lacked standing to sue. The
production of a voting trust agreement was held a sufficient explanation for the failure
to produce stock certificates and a sufficient demonstration of an interest which could
be protected by suit.

